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Abstract—Membership inference attacks seek to infer the
membership of individual training instances of a privately trained
model. This paper presents a membership privacy analysis and
evaluation system, called MPLens, with three unique contribu-
tions. First, through MPLens, we demonstrate how membership
inference attack methods can be leveraged in adversarial ma-
chine learning. Second, through MPLens, we highlight how the
vulnerability of pre-trained models under membership inference
attack is not uniform across all classes, particularly when the
training data itself is skewed. We show that risk from member-
ship inference attacks is routinely increased when models use
skewed training data. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of
differential privacy as a mitigation technique against membership
inference attacks. We discuss the trade-offs of implementing
such a mitigation strategy with respect to the model complexity,
the learning task complexity, the dataset complexity and the
privacy parameter settings. Our empirical results reveal that (1)
minority groups within skewed datasets display increased risk for
membership inference and (2) differential privacy presents many
challenging trade-offs as a mitigation technique to membership
inference risk.
Index Terms—membership inference, differential privacy, data
skewness, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) has seen an ex-
plosion of interest with the development of cloud platform
services. Many cloud service providers, such as Amazon [1],
Google [2], IBM [3], and Microsoft [4], have launched such
MLaaS platforms. These services allow consumers and appli-
cation companies to leverage powerful machine learning and
artificial intelligence technologies without requiring in-house
domain expertise. Most MLaaS platforms offer two categories
of services. (1) Machine learning model training. This type of
service allows users and application companies to upload their
datasets (often sensitive) and perform task-specific analysis
including private machine learning and data analytics. The
ultimate goal of this service is to construct one or more trained
predictive models. (2) Hosting service for pre-trained models.
This service provides pre-trained models with a prediction
API. Consumers are able to select and query such APIs to
obtain task specific data analytic results on their own query
data.
With the exponential growth of digital data in governments,
enterprises, and social media, there has also been a growing
demand for data privacy protections, leading to legislation
such as HIPAA [5], GDPR [6], and the 2018 California
privacy law [7]. Such legislation puts limits on the sharing
and transmission of the data analyzed by these platforms and
used to train predictive models. All MLaaS providers and
platforms are therefore subject to the compliance of such
privacy regulations.
With the new opportunities of MLaaS and the growing
attention on privacy compliance, we have seen a rapid increase
in the study of potential vulnerabilities involved in deploying
MLaaS platforms and services. Membership inference attacks
and adversarial examples represent two specific vulnerabilities
against deep learning models trained and deployed using
MLaaS platforms. With more mission critical cyber appli-
cations and systems using machine learning algorithms as a
critical functional component, such vulnerabilities are a major
and growing threat to the safety of cyber-systems in general
and the trust and accountability of algorithmic decision making
in particular.
Membership Inference. Membership inference refers to
the ability of an attacker to infer the membership of training
examples used during model training. We call a membership
inference a black-box attack if the attacker only has the access
to the prediction API of a privately trained model hosted by
a MLaaS provider. A black-box attacker therefore does not
have any knowledge of either the private training process or
the privately trained model.
Consider a financial institution with a large database of
previous loan applications. This financial institution leverages
its large quantity of data in conjunction with a MLaaS platform
to develop a predictive model. The goal of constructing such
a model is to provide prediction when given individuals’
personal financial data as input, such as a likelihood of being
approved for a loan under multiple credit evaluation categories.
This privately trained predictive model is then deployed with
a MLaaS API at different offices of this financial institution.
When potential applicants provide their own data to the query
API, they receive some prediction statistics on their chance of
receiving the desired loan and perhaps even the ways in which
they may improve their likelihood of loan approval. In the
context of the loan application approval model, a membership
inference attack considers a scenario wherein a user of the
prediction service is an attacker. This attacker provides data
of a target individual X and, based on the model’s output, the
attacker tries to infer if X had applied for a loan at the given
financial institution.
Both the financial institution and individual X have an in-
terest in protecting against such membership inference attacks.
Loan applicants (such as X) consider their applications and
financial data to be sensitive and private. They do not want
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their loan to be public knowledge. The financial institution also
owns the training dataset and the privately trained model and
likely considers their training data to not only be confidential
for consumer privacy but also an organizational asset [8]. It is
therefore a high priority for MLaaS providers and companies
to protect their private training datasets against membership
inference risks for maintaining and increasing their competi-
tive edge.
Adversarial Machine Learning. The second category of
vulnerability is the adversarial input attacks against modern
machine learning models, also referred to as adversarial ma-
chine learning (ML). Adversarial ML attacks are broadly clas-
sified into two categories: (1) evasion attacks wherein attackers
aim to mislead pre-trained models and cause inaccurate output;
and (2) poisoning attacks which aim to generate a poisonous
trained model by manipulating its construction during the
training process. Such poisoned models will misbehave at pre-
diction time and can be deceived by the attacker. Adversarial
deep learning research to date has been primarily centered
on the generation of adversarial examples by injecting the
minimal amount of perturbation to benign examples required
to either (1) cause a pre-trained classification model to mis-
classify the query examples with high confidence or (2) cause a
training algorithm to produce a learning model with inaccurate
or toxic behavior.
The risks of adversarial ML have triggered a flurry of
attention and research efforts on developing defense methods
against such deception attacks. As predictive models take a
critical role in many sensitive or mission critical systems and
application domains, such as healthcare, self-driving cars, and
cyber manufacturing, there is a growing demand for privacy
preserving machine learning which is secure against these
attacks. For example, the ability of adversarial ML attacks to
trick a self-driving car into identifying a stop sign as a speed
limit sign poses a significant safety risk. Given that most of the
prediction models targeted are hosted by MLaaS providers and
kept private with only a black-box access API, one common
approach in developing adversarial example attacks is to use a
substitute model of the target prediction model. This substitute
model can be constructed in two steps. First, use membership
inference methods to infer the training data of the target model
and its distribution. Then, utilize this data and distribution
information to train a substitute model.
Interestingly, most of the research efforts to date have
been centered on defense methods against already developed
adversarial examples [9] but few efforts have been dedicated to
the countermeasures against membership inference risks and
an attacker’s ability to develop an effective substitute model.
In this paper, we focus on investigating two key problems re-
garding model vulnerability to membership inference attacks.
First, we are interested in understanding how skewness in
training data may impact the membership inference threat.
Second, we are interested in understanding a frequently asked
question: can differentially private model training mitigate
membership inference vulnerability? This includes several
related questions, such as when such mitigation might be
effective and the reasons why differential privacy may not
always be the magic bullet to fully conquer all membership
inference threats.
Machine learning with Differential Privacy. Differential
privacy provides a formal mathematical framework, which
bounds the impact of individual instances on the output of
a function when this function is constructed in a differentially
private manner. In the context of deep learning, a deep neural
network model is said to be differentially private if its training
function is differentially private therefore guaranteeing the
privacy of its training data. Thus, conceptually, differential
privacy provides a natural mitigation strategy against mem-
bership inference threats. If training processes could limit the
impact that any single individual instance may have on the
model output, then the differential privacy theory [10] would
guarantee that an attacker would be incapable of identifying
with high confidence that an individual example is included in
the training dataset. Additionally, recent research has indicated
that differential privacy also has a connection to the model
robustness against adversarial examples [11].
Unfortunately, differential privacy can be challenging to
implement efficiently in deep neural network training for a
number of reasons. First, it introduces a substantial num-
ber of parameters into the machine learning process, which
already has an overwhelming number of hyper-parameters
for performance tuning. Second, existing differentially private
deep learning methods tend to have a high cost in prolonged
training time and lower training and testing accuracy. The
effort for improving deep learning with differential privacy
has therefore been centered on improving training efficiency
and maintaining high training accuracy [12], [13]. We argue
that balancing privacy, security, and utility remains an open
challenge for supporting differential privacy in the context of
machine learning in general, and deep neural network model
training in particular.
Contributions of the paper. In this paper, we present
a privacy analysis and compliance evaluation system, called
MPLens, which investigates Membership Privacy through a
multi-dimensional Lens. MPLens aims to expose membership
inference vulnerabilities, including those unique to varying
distributions of the training data. We also leverage MPLens
to investigate differential privacy as a mitigation technique
for membership inference risk in the context of deep neural
network model training. Our privacy analysis system can
serve for both MLaaS providers and data scientists to conduct
privacy analysis and privacy compliance evaluation. This paper
presents our initial design and implementation of MPLens and
it makes three original contributions.
First, through MPLens, we demonstrate how membership
inference attack methodologies can be leveraged in adversarial
ML. Datasets developed by using the model prediction API for
MLaaS not only reveal private information about the training
dataset, such as the underlying distributions of the private
training data, but they can also be used in developing and
validating the adverse utility of adversarial examples.
Second, MPLens identifies and highlights that the vulnera-
bility of pre-trained models to the membership inference attack
is not uniform when the training data itself is skewed. We
show that risk from membership inference attacks is routinely
increased when models use skewed training data. This vul-
nerability variation becomes particularly acute in federated
learning environments wherein participants are likely to hold
information representing different subsets of the population
and therefore may incur different vulnerability to attack due to
their participation. We argue that an in-depth understanding of
such disparities in privacy risks represent an important aspect
for promoting fairness and accountability in machine learning.
Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of differential pri-
vacy as a mitigation technique against membership inference
attacks, with a focus on deep learning models. We discuss
the trade-offs of implementing such a mitigation strategy for
preventing membership inference and the impact of differential
privacy on different classes when deep neural network (DNN)
models are trained using skewed training datasets.
II. MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
Attackers conducting membership inference attacks seek to
identify whether or not an individual is a member of the dataset
used to train a particular target machine learning model.
We discuss the definition and the generation of membership
inference attacks in this section, which will serve as the basic
reference model of membership inference.
A. Attack Definition
In studying membership inference attacks there are two
primary sets of processes at play: (1) the training, deployment,
and use of the machine learning model which the attacker is
targeting for inference and (2) the development and use of the
membership inference attack. Each of these two elements has
guiding pre-defined objectives impacting respective outputs.
1) Machine Learning Model Training and Prediction:
The training of and prediction using the machine learning
model which the attacker is targeting may be formalized
as follows. Consider a dataset D comprised of n training
instances (x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn) with each instance xi
containing m features, denoted by xi = (xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,m),
and a class value yi ∈ Zk, where k is a finite integer ≥ 2.
Let Ft : Rm → Rk be the target model trained using
this dataset D. Ft is then deployed as a service such that
users can provide a feature vector x ∈ Rm, and the service
will then output a probability vector p ∈ Rk of the form
p = (p1, p2, ..., pk), where pi ∈ [0, 1]∀i, and
∑k
i=1 pi = 1.
The prediction class label y according to Ft for a feature vector
x is the class with highest probability value in p. Therefore
y = arg maxi∈Zk Ft(x).
2) Membership Inference Definition: Given some level of
access to the trained model Ft the attacker conducts his or her
own training to develop a binary classifier which serves as the
membership inference attack model. The most limited access
environment in which an attacker may conduct the member-
ship inference attack is the black-box access environment. That
is, an environment wherein the attacker may only query the
target model Ft through some machine learning as a service
API and receive only the corresponding prediction vectors.
Let us consider an attacker with such black-box access to
Ft. Given only a query input x and output Ft(x) from some
target model Ft trained using a dataset D, the membership
inference attacker attempts to identify whether or not x ∈ D.
Dataset Accuracy of Membership Inference (%)
Adult 59.89
MNIST 61.75
CIFAR-10 90.44
Purchases-10 82.29
Purchases-20 88.98
Purchases-50 93.71
Purchases-100 95.74
TABLE I: Attack accuracies targeting decision tree models. Baseline
accuracy against which to compare results is 50%.
Many different datasets and model types have demonstrated
vulnerability to membership inference attacks in black-box
settings. Table I reports 5 accuracy results for black-box
attackers targeting decision tree models for problems ranging
from binary classification (Adult) to 100-class classification
(Purchases-100). We note that all experiments evaluated the
attack model against an equal number of instances in the target
training dataset D as those not in D. The baseline membership
inference accuracy is therefore 50%. We refer readers to [14]
for more details on these datasets and experimental set up.
These results demonstrate both the viability of membership
inference attacks as well as the variation in vulnerability
between datasets. This accentuates the need for practitioners
to evaluate their system’s specific vulnerability.
Recently, researchers showed similar membership inference
vulnerability in settings where attackers have white-box access
to the target model, including the output from the intermediate
layers of a pre-trained neural network model or the gradients
for the target instance [15]. Interestingly, this study showed
that the intermediate layer outputs, in most cases, do not lead
to significant improvements in attack accuracy. For example,
with the CIFAR-100 dataset and AlexNet model structure, a
black-box attack achieves 74.6% accuracy while the white-
box attack achieves 75.18% accuracy. This result further
supports the understanding that the attackers can gain sufficient
knowledge from only the black-box access to the pre-trained
models which is common in MLaaS platforms. Attackers do
not require either full or even partial knowledge of the pre-
trained target model as black-box attacks include the primary
source of membership inference vulnerability.
B. Attack Generation
The attack generation process can vary significantly based
on the power of the attacker. For example, the attack pro-
posed in [16] requires knowledge of the training error of
Ft. The attack technique proposed in [17], however, requires
computational power and involves the training of multiple
machine learning models. The techniques proposed in [18]
Fig. 1: Workflow of the membership inference attack generation.
are different still in that they require the attacker to develop
effective threshold values. Figure 1 gives a workflow sketch
of membership inference attack generation algorithm. We use
the shadow model technique documented in [17] and [14] to
describe the attack generation process of membership infer-
ence attacks, while noting that many of the processes may be
applicable to other attack generation techniques.
1) Generating Shadow Data and Substitute Models: In the
shadow model technique, an attacker must first generate or
access a shadow dataset, a synthetic labeled dataset D′ to
mirror the data in D. While [17] and [14] both outline potential
approaches to generating such a synthetic dataset from scratch,
we would like to note that in many cases, attackers may also
have examples of their own which can be used as seeds for the
shadow data generation process or to bootstrap their shadow
dataset. Consider our example of the financial institution. A
competitor to the target institution may in fact have their own
customer data, which could be leveraged to bootstrap a shadow
dataset.
Once the attacker has developed the shadow dataset D′, the
next phase of the membership inference attack is to leverage
D′ to train and observe a series of shadow models. Specifically,
the shadow dataset is used to train multiple shadow models
each of which is designed to emulate the behavior of the
target model. Each shadow model is trained on a subset of the
shadow dataset D′. As the attacker knows which portion of
D′ was provided to each shadow model, the attacker may then
observe the shadow models’ behavior in response to instances
which were in their training set versus behavior in response
to those that were held out.
2) Generating Attack Datasets and Models: Attackers use
the observations of the shadow models to develop an attack
dataset D∗ which captures the difference between the output
generated by the shadow models for instances included in the
training data and those previously unseen by models.
Once the attack dataset D∗ has been developed, D∗ is used
to generate a binary classifier Fa which provides predictions
on whether an instance was previously known to a model based
on the model’s output from that instance. At attack time this
binary classifier may the be deployed against the target model
service in a black-box setting. The attack model takes as input
prediction vectors of the same structure as those provided by
the shadow models and contained within D∗ and produces
as output a prediction of 0 or 1 representing “out” and “in”
respectively with the former indicating an instance that was
not in the training dataset of the target model and the latter
indicating an instance that was included.
The totality of these two phases: (1) generating shadow data
and substitute models and (2) generating attack datasets and
models, constitute the primary processes for constructing the
membership inference attack.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE
A. Impact of Model Based Factors on Membership Inference
The most widely acknowledged factor impacting vulnerabil-
ity to membership inference attacks is the degree of overfitting
in the trained target model. Shokri et al. [17] demonstrate that
the more over-fitted a DNN model is, the more it leaks under
membership inference attacks. Yeom et al. [16] investigated
the role of overfitting from both the theoretical and the
experimental perspectives. While their results confirm that
models become more vulnerable as they overfit more severely,
the authors also state that overfitting is not the only factor
leading to model vulnerability under the membership inference
attack. Truex et al. [14] further demonstrate that several other
model based factors also play important roles in causing model
vulnerability to membership inference, such as classification
problem complexity, in-class standard deviation, and the type
of machine learning model targeted.
B. Impact of Attacker Knowledge on Membership Inference
Another category of factors that may cause model vulnera-
bility to the membership inference attacks is the type and scope
of knowledge which attackers may have about the target model
and its training parameters. For example, Truex et al. [14]
identified the impact that attacker knowledge with respect to
both the training data of the target model and the target data
have on the accuracy of the membership inference attack. This
was evaluated by varying the degree of noise in the shadow
dataset and target data used by the attacker. Table II shows
the experimental results on four datasets with four types of
learning tasks. The datasets include the CIFAR-10 dataset
which contains 32×32 color images of 10 different classes
of objects while the Purchases datasets were developed from
the Kaggle Acquire Valued Shoppers Challenge dataset con-
taining the shopping history of several thousand individuals.
Each instance in the Purchases datasets then represents an
individual and each feature represents a particular product.
If an individual has a purchase history with this product in
the Kaggle Acquired Valued Shoppers Challenge dataset, there
will be a 1 for the feature and otherwise a 0. The instances
are then clustered into different shopping profile types which
are treated as the classes. Table II reports results for Purchases
datasets considering 10, 20, and 50 different shopping profile
types.
The experiments in Table II demonstrate the impact of the
attacker knowledge of the target data points by evaluating
how adding varying degrees of to data features may impact
on the success rate of membership inference attacks. Noise
uniformly sampled from [0, σ], σ ≤ 1 and added to features
Degree of Noise
Attack Accuracy (%) Attack Accuracy (%)
with Noisy Target Data with Noisy Shadow Data
CIFAR-10 Purchases-10 Purchases-20 Purchases-50 CIFAR-10 Purchases-10 Purchases-20 Purchases-50
0 67.49 66.69 80.70 88.52 67.49 66.69 80.70 88.52
0.1 65.37 68.72 80.40 86.38 66.85 67.37 80.23 88.81
0.2 63.88 66.01 77.47 85.85 65.36 66.86 81.20 88.35
0.3 60.43 62.90 73.93 84.66 64.74 67.46 80.32 88.84
0.4 60.48 60.07 68.23 83.21 62.64 66.91 80.14 88.63
0.5 58.33 58.29 64.73 79.12 60.94 67.61 80.36 88.17
0.6 57.53 57.58 61.51 73.50 60.09 66.68 80.08 88.54
0.7 55.97 54.94 59.78 70.43 58.92 67.67 80.83 88.58
0.8 55.35 54.44 58.21 67.16 58.66 66.73 80.49 88.54
0.9 54.07 54.03 57.91 65.21 57.57 68.06 80.52 87.84
1.0 53.95 52.72 56.02 62.44 56.55 67.32 80.43 87.70
TABLE II: Impact of noisy target data and noisy shadow data
normalized within [0, 1]. Given a level of uncertainty of x
or inaccuracy in D′ on the part of the attacker, represented
by a corresponding degree of noise σ, Table II evaluates
how effective the attacker remains in launching a membership
inference attack to identify if x ∈ D or x /∈ D. The results
reported in Table II are reported for four logistic regression
models, each one trained on a different dataset with gradually
increasing σ values (degree of noise).
We make two interesting observations from Table II. First,
for all four datasets, the more accurate (the less noise) the
attacker knowledge about x is, the higher the model vulner-
ability (attack success rate) to membership inference. This
shows the accuracy of attacker knowledge about the targeted
examples is an important factor in determining model vulner-
ability and attack success rate (in terms of attack accuracy).
Second, in comparison to the noisy target data, adding noise
to the shadow dataset results in a less severe drop in accuracy.
Similar trends are however still observed with slightly higher
attack success rates under smaller σ values for all four datasets.
This set of experiments demonstrates that attackers with dif-
ferent knowledge and different levels of resources may have
different success rates in launching a membership inference
attack. Thus, model vulnerability should be evaluated by
taking into account potential or available attacker knowledge.
C. Transferability of Membership Inference
Inspired by the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples [19], [20], [21], [22], membership inference attacks are
also shown to be transferable. That is, attack model Fa trained
on an attack dataset D∗ containing the outputs from a set of
shadow models is effective not only when shadow models and
the target model are of the same type but also when the shadow
model type varies. This property further opens the door to the
black-box attackers who do not have any knowledge of the
target model.
Table III demonstrates this property of membership in-
ference attacks. It reports the membership inference attack
accuracy for various attack configurations against a decision
tree model trained on the Purchases-20 dataset. It shows the
transferability of membership inference attacks for different
combinations from four different model types uses as the
attack model type Fa (rows) and the shadow model type
(columns). In this experiment, the target prediction model is
Purchases-20 Shadow Model Type
Attack Model DT k-NN LR NB
DT 88.98 87.49 72.08 81.84
k-NN 88.23 72.57 84.75 74.27
LR 89.02 88.11 88.99 83.57
NB 88.96 78.60 89.05 66.34
TABLE III: Accuracy (%) of membership inference attack against a
decision tree target model trained on the Purchases-20 dataset.
a decision tree. We observe that while using decision tree as
the shadow model results in the most consistent membership
inference attack success compared to other combinations,
multiple combinations with both k-NN and logistic regression
(LR) shadow models achieve attack success within 5% of gap
compared to the most successful attack configuration using
decision tree shadow models. Table III also shows that multiple
types of models can be successful as the binary attack classifier
Fa. This set of experiments also shows that the worst attack
performances against the DT target prediction model are seen
when the shadow models are trained using Naı¨ve Bayes (NB),
with the worst performance reported when NB is the model
type of the attack model as well. These results indicate that
(1) the same strategy used for selecting the shadow model
type may not be optimal for the attack model and (2) shadow
models of different types other than the target model type may
still lead to successful membership inference attacks. We refer
readers to [14] for additional detail.
The transferability study in Table III indicates an attacker
does not always need to know the exact target model con-
figuration to launch an effective membership inference attack
as attack models can be transferable from one target model
type to another. And although finding the most effective attack
strategy can be a challenging task for attackers, vulnerability
to membership inference attack remains serious even with
suboptimal attack configurations with almost all configurations
reporting attack accuracy about 70% and many above 85%.
D. Training Data Skewness on Membership Attacks
The fourth important dimension of membership inference
vulnerability is the risk imbalance across different prediction
classes when the training data is skewed. Even when the
overall membership inference vulnerability appears limited
with attack success close to the 50% baseline (in or out random
Fig. 2: Vulnerability of Adult dataset highlighting minority (>50K)
class with decision trees.
guess), there may be subgroups within the training data, which
display significantly more vulnerability.
For example, Figure 2 illustrates the impact of data skew-
ness on membership inference vulnerability. In this set of
experiments, we measure the membership inference attack
accuracy for a decision tree target model trained on the pub-
licly available Adult dataset [23]. The adult dataset contains
48,842 instances, each with 14 different features and presents
a binary classification problem wherein one wishes to identify
if an individual’s yearly salary is > $50K or ≤ $50K. The
class distribution, however, is skewed with less than 25%
of instances being labeled >$50K. As overfitting is widely
considered a key factor in membership inference vulnerabil-
ity, we simulate overfitting by increasing the depth of the
target decision tree model. Figure 2 shows that the impact
of overfitting (increasing in X-axis) on both the aggregate
membership inference vulnerability in terms of membership
inference attack accuracy (accuracy over all classes) and the
minority membership inference vulnerability (attack accuracy
over the minority class). In this case aggregate vulnerability is
the accuracy of the membership inference attack evaluated on
an equal number of randomly selected examples seen by the
target model (“in”) as as unseen (“out”) while the minority
vulnerability reports the membership inference attack accu-
racy evaluated on only the subset of the previously selected
examples whose class is >$50K (the minority class).
We observe from Figure 2 that, the minority class has an
increased risk under the membership inference attack as the
model over-fits more severely. This follows the intuition that
minority class members have fewer other instances amongst
whom they can hide in the training set and thus are more
easily exposed under membership inference attacks. This
aligns well to some extent with the observation that smaller
training dataset sizes can lead to a greater overall risk for
membership inference [17]. We argue that it is important for
both data owners for model training and the MLaaS providers
to consider vulnerability not just for the entire training dataset,
but also the level of risk for minority populations specifically
when evaluating privacy compliance.
IV. MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND ALGORITHMS
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal privacy framework with a
theoretical foundation and rigorous mathematical guarantees
when effectively employed [10]. A machine learning algorithm
is defined to be differentially private if and only if the
inclusion of a single instance in the training dataset will cause
only statistically insignificant changes to the output of the
algorithm. Theoretical limits are set on such output changes in
the definition of differential privacy, which is given formally
as follows:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [10]): A randomized
mechanism K provides (, δ)- differential privacy if for any
two neighboring database D1 and D2 that differ in only a
single entry, ∀S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr(K(D1) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(K(D2) ∈ S) + δ (1)
If δ = 0, K is said to satisfy -differential privacy.
In the remaining of the paper, we focus on -differential
privacy for presentation convenience. To achieve -differential
privacy (DP), noise defined by  is added to the algorithm’s
output. This noise is proportional to the sensitivity of the
output. Sensitivity measures the maximum change of the
output due to the inclusion of a single data instance.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity [10]): For f : D → Rk, the
sensitivity of f is
∆ = max
D1,D2
||f(D1)− f(D2)||2 (2)
for all D1, D2 differing in at most one element.
The noise mechanism which is used is therefore bounded
by both the sensitivity of the function f , Sf , and the privacy
parameter . For example, consider the Gaussian mechanism
defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Gaussian Noise Mechanism): M(d) , f(D)+
N(0, S2fσ
2)
where N(0, S2fσ
2) is the normal distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation Sfσ. A single application of the Gaussian
mechanism in Definition 3 to a function f with sensitivity Sf
satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if δ ≥ 54exp(−(σ)2/2) and
 < 1 [24].
Additionally, there exist several nice properties of differ-
ential privacy for either multiple iterations of a differentially
private function f or the combination of multiple different
functions f1, f2, ... wherein each fi satisfies a corresponding
i-differential privacy. These composition properties are im-
portant for machine learning processes which often involve
multiple passes over the training dataset D. The formal compo-
sition properties of differential privacy include the following:
Definition 4 (Composition properties [24], [25]): Let
f1, f2, . . . , fn be n algorithms, such that for each i ∈ [1, n],
fi satisfies i-DP. Then, the following properties hold:
• Sequential Composition: Releasing the outputs
f1(D), f2(D), . . . , fn(D) satisfies (
∑n
i=1 i)-DP.
• Parallel Composition: Executing each algorithm on a
disjoint subset of D satisfies maxi(i)-DP.
• Immunity to Post-processing: Computing a function of
the output of a differentially private algorithm does not
deteriorate its privacy, e.g., publicly releasing the output
of fi(D) or using it as an input to another algorithm does
not violate i-DP.
Differential privacy can be employed to different types of
machine learning models. Due to the space constraint, in the
rest of the paper, we specifically focus on differentially private
training of deep neural network (DNN) models.
B. Mechanisms for Differentially Private Deep Learning
DNNs are complex, sequentially stacked neural networks
containing multiple layers of interconnected nodes. Each node
represents the dataset in a unique way and each layer of
networked nodes processes the input from previous layers
using learned weights and a pre-defined activation function.
The objective in training a DNN is to find the optimal weight
values for each node in the multi-tier networks. This is ac-
complished by making multiple passes over the entire dataset
with each pass constituting one epoch. Within each epoch, the
entire dataset is partitioned into many mini-batches of equal
size and the algorithm processes these batches sequentially,
each including only a subset of the data. When processing
one batch, the data is fed forward through the network using
the existing weight values. A pre-defined loss function is
computed for the errors made by the neural network learner
with respect to the current batch of data. An optimizer, such as
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), is then used to propagate
these errors backward through the network. The weights are
then updated according to the errors and the learning rate
set by the training algorithm. The higher the learning rate
value, the larger the update made in response to the backward
propagation of errors.
Differentially private deep learning can be implemented by
adding a small amount of noise to the updates made to the
network such that there is only a marginal difference between
the following two scenarios: (1) when a particular individual
is included within the training dataset and (2) when the indi-
vidual is absent from the training dataset. The noise added to
the updates is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with scale
determined by an appropriate noise parameter σ corresponding
to a desired level of privacy and controlled sensitivity. That
is, the privacy budget , according to Definition 1, should
constrain the value of σ at each epoch. Let n denote the
number of epochs for the DNN training, a pre-defined hyper-
parameter set at the training configuration as the termination
condition. Let one epoch satisfy i-differential privacy given
σi from the Gaussian mechanism in Definition 3. Then, a
traditional accounting using the composition properties of
differential privacy (Definition 4) would dictate that n epochs
would result in an overall privacy guarantee of  if i = /n,
and each epoch employed the Gaussian mechanism with the
same value σi. We refer to this approach the fixed noise
perturbation method [12]. An alternative approach proposed
by Yu et. al. in [13] advocates a variable noise perturbation
approach, which uses a decaying function to manage the total
privacy budget  and define variable noise scale σ based on
different settings of i for each different epoch i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
aiming to add variable amount of noise to the ith epoch in a
decreasing manner as the training progresses in epochs. Thus,
we have i 6= j for i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and σi for a given
epoch i is bounded by its allocated privacy budget i. The
same overall privacy guarantee is met when
∑n
i=1 i,=  for
the differentially private DNN training of n epochs.
C. Differentially Private Deep Learning with Fixed σ
The first differentially private approach to training deep
neural networks is proposed by Abadi et al. [12] and imple-
mented on the tensorflow deep learning framework [26]. A
summary of their approach is given in Algorithm 1. To apply
differential privacy, the sensitivity of each epoch is bounded
by a clipping value C, specifying that an instance may impact
weight updates by at most the value C. To achieve differential
privacy, weight updates at the end of each batch include noise
injection according to the sensitivity defined by C and the
scale of noise σ. The choice of σ is directly related to the
overall privacy guarantee.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Deep Learning: Fixed σ
Input: Dataset D containing training instances x1, ..., xN , loss
function L(θ) = 1/N
∑
i L(θ, xi), learning rate ηt, noise scale
σ, batch size L, norm bound C, number of epochs E
Initialize θ0 randomly
Set T = E ∗N/L
for t ∈ [T ] do
Set sampling probability q = L/N
Take a random sample Lt from D
Compute gradient
For each xi ∈ Lt, compute gt(xi)← ∇θtL(θt, xi)
Clip gradient
g¯t(xi)← gt(xi)/max(1, ‖gt(xi)‖2C )
Add Noise
g˜t ← 1/L(
∑
i g¯t(xi) +N(0, σ
2C2I))
Descent
θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜t
Output θT and compute the overall privacy cost (, δ) using
a privacy accounting method.
Let σ =
√
2 log(1/δ)
 , then according to differential privacy
theory [24], each step (processing of a batch) is (, δ)-
differentially private. If Lt is randomly sampled from D
then additional properties of random sampling [27], [28] may
be applied. Each step then becomes (O(q), qδ)-differentially
private. The moments accountant privacy accounting method
is also introduced in [12] to prove that Algorithm 1 is
(O(q
√
T ), δ)-differentially private given appropriate parame-
ter settings.
We refer to Algorithm 1 as the fixed noise perturbation
approach as each epoch is treated equally by introducing the
same noise scale to every parameter update.
D. Differentially Private Deep Learning with Variable σ
The variable noise perturbation approach to differentially
private deep learning is proposed by Yu et al. [13]. It extends
the fixed noise scale of σ over the total n epochs in [12]
by introducing two new capabilities. First, Yu et al. in [13]
pointed out a limitation of the approach outlined in Algorithm
1. Namely, Algorithm 1 specifically calls for random sampling,
wherein each batch is selected randomly with replacement.
However, the most popular implementation for partitioning a
dataset into mini-batches in many deep learning frameworks
is random shuffling, wherein the dataset is shuffled and then
partitioned into evenly sized batches. In order to develop a
differentially private DNN model under random shuffling, Yu
et.al [13] extends Algorithm 1 of [12] by introducing a new
privacy accounting method.
Additionally, Yu et al. [13] analyze the problem of using
fixed noise scale (fixed σ values), and propose employing
different noise scales to the weight updates at different stages
of the training process. Specifically, Yu et al. [13] propose a
set of methods for privacy budget allocation, which improve
model accuracy by progressively reducing the noise scale as
the training progresses. The variable σ noise scale approach is
inspired by two observations. First, as the training progresses,
the model begins to converge causing the noise being intro-
duced to the updates to potentially become more impactful.
This slows down the rate of model convergence and causes
later epochs to no longer increase model accuracy compared
to non-private scenarios. Second, the research on improving
training accuracy and convergence rate of DNN training has
led to a new generation of learning rate functions that replace
the constant learning rate baseline by decaying learning rate
functions and cyclic learning rates [29], [30]. Yu et al. [13]
employed a similar set of decay functions to add noise at a
decreased scale. That is, the noise defined by σi at the ith
epoch as the training progresses is less than σj at the jth
epoch given 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n. The performance of four different
types of decay functions to introduce variable noise scale by
partitioning σ over n epochs were evaluated.
E. Important Implementation Factors
1) Choosing Epsilon: In differentially private algorithms,
the  value dictates the amount of noise which must be
introduced into the DNN model training and therefore the the-
oretical privacy bound. Choosing the correct  value requires
a careful balance between tolerable privacy leakage given the
practical setting as well as the tolerable utility loss.
For example, Naldi and D’Acquisto propose a method
in [31] for finding the optimal  value to meet a certain accu-
racy for Laplacian mechanisms. Lee and Clifton alternatively
employ the approach in [32] to analyze a particular adversarial
model. Hsu et. al [33], on the other hand, takes an individual’s
perspective on data privacy by opt-in incentivization. Kohli
and Laskowski [34] also promote choosing an  based on
individual privacy preferences.
Despite these existing approaches, determining the “right”
 value remains a complex problem and is likely to be highly
dependent on the privacy policy of the organization that owns
the model and the dataset, the vulnerability of the model, the
sensitivity of the data, and the tolerance to utility loss in the
given setting. Additionally, there might be scenarios, such as
the healthcare setting, in which even small degrees of utility
loss are intolerable and are combined with stringent privacy
constraints given highly sensitive data. In these cases, it may
be hard or even impossible to find a good  value for existing
differentially private DNN training techniques.
2) The Role of Transfer learning: Another key consider-
ation is the use of transfer learning for dealing with more
complex datasets [12], [13]. For example, model parameters
may be initialized by training on a non-private, similar dataset.
The private dataset is then only used to further hone a subset
of the model parameters. This helps to reduce the number
of parameters affected by the noise addition required by
exercising differential privacy. The use of transfer learning
however relies on a strong assumption that such a non-private,
similar dataset exists and and is available. In many cases, this
assumption may be unrealistic.
3) Parameter Optimization: In additional to the privacy
budget parameters (, δ), differentially private deep learning
introduces influential privacy parameters, such as the clipping
value C that bounds the sensitivity for each epoch and the
noise scale approach (including potential decay parameters)
for σ. The settings of these privacy parameters may impact
both the training convergence rate, and thus the training time,
and the training and testing accuracy. However, tuning these
privacy parameters becomes much more complex as we need
to take into account the many learning hyper-parameters al-
ready present in DNN training, such as the number of epochs,
the batch size, the learning rate policy, and the optimization
algorithm. These hyper-parameters need to be carefully con-
figured for high performance training of deep neural networks
in a non-private setting. For deep learning with differential
privacy, one needs to configure the privacy parameters by
considering the side effect on other hyper-parameters and re-
configure the previously tuned learning hyper-parameters to
account for the privacy approach.
For example, for a fixed total privacy budget values (, δ),
too small of a number of epochs may result in reduced
accuracy due to insufficient time to learn. A higher number of
epochs however will result in a higher σ value required each
epoch (recall Algorithm 1). Therefore, a carefully tuned hyper-
parameter for a non-private setting, such as the optimal number
of epochs, may no longer be effective when differentially
private deep learning is enabled.
A number of challenging questions remain open problems
in differentially private DNN training, such as at what point do
more epochs lead to accuracy loss under a particular privacy
setting? What is the right noise decaying function for effective
deep learning with differential privacy? Can we learn privately
with high accuracy given complex datasets? The balance of
the many parameters in a differentially private deep learning
system presents new challenges to practitioners.
With these questions in mind, we develop MPLens, a mem-
bership privacy analysis system, which facilitates the eval-
uation of model vulnerability against membership inference
attacks. Through MPLens, we investigate the effectiveness of
differential privacy as a mitigation technique against mem-
bership inference attacks, including the trade-offs of imple-
menting such a mitigation strategy for preventing membership
inference and the impact of differential privacy on different
classes for the DNN models trained using skewed training
datasets. We also highlight how the vulnerability of pre-
trained models under the membership inference attack is not
uniform when the training data itself is skewed with minority
populations. We show how this vulnerability variation may
cause increased risks in federated learning systems.
V. MPLENS: SYSTEM OVERVIEW
MPLens is designed as a privacy analysis and privacy
compliance evaluation system for both data scientists and
MLaaS providers to understand the membership inference
vulnerability risk involved in their model training and model
prediction process. Figure 3 provides an overview of the
system architecture. The system allows providers to specify
a set of factors that are critical to privacy analysis. Example
factors include the data used to train their model, what data
might be held by the attacker, what attack technique might be
used, the degree of data skewness in the training set, whether
the prediction model is constructed using the differentially
private model training, what configurations are used for the
set of differential privacy parameters, and so forth. Given
the model input, the MPLens evaluation system reports the
overall statistics on the vulnerability of the model, the per-
class vulnerability, as well as the vulnerability of any sensi-
tive populations such as specific minority groups. Example
statistics include attack accuracy, precision, recall, and f-1
score. We also include attacker confidence for true positives,
false positives, true negatives, and false negatives, the average
distance from both the false positives and the false negatives to
the training data, and the time required to execute the attack.
A. Target Model Training
Over-fitting is the first factor that MPLens measures for con-
ducting membership vulnerability analysis. MPLens specif-
ically highlights the overfitting analysis by reporting the
Accuracy Difference between the target model training ac-
curacy and testing accuracy. This enables MLaaS providers
and domain-specific data scientists to understand whether
their vulnerability might be linked to overfitting. As previ-
ously indicated, while overfitting is strongly correlated with
membership inference vulnerability, it is not the only source
of vulnerability. Thus, when MPLens indicates undesirable
vulnerability an absence of significant overfitting, analysis may
be triggered to investigate if vulnerability is linked to other
model or data characteristics as those discussed in Section III.
B. Attacker Knowledge
Our MPLens system is by design customizable to un-
derstand multiple attack scenarios. For instance, users may
specify the shadow data, which is used by the attacker. This
allows the user to consider a scenario in which the attacker
has access to some subset of the target model’s training data,
one where the attacker has access to some data that are drawn
from the same distribution as the training data of the target
model, or one where the attacker has noisy and inaccurate
data, such as that evaluated in Table II and possibly generated
through black-box probing [14], [17].
The MPLens system is additionally customizable with
respect to the attack method, including the shadow model
based attack techniques [17], and the threshold-based attack
techniques [16]. Furthermore, when using a threshold-based
attack, our MPLens system can either accept pre-determined
values representing attacker knowledge of the target model
error or it can also determine good threshold values through
the shadow model training.
These customizations allow MLaaS providers and users of
MPLens to specify the types of attackers they wish to analyze,
analyze their model vulnerability against such attackers, and
evaluate the privacy compliance of their model training and
model prediction services.
C. Transferability
Another aspect of privacy analysis is related to the spe-
cific model training methods used to generate membership
inference attacks and whether different methods result in
significant variations in membership inference vulnerability.
Consider the attack method from [17], the user can specify
not only the attacker’s data but also the shadow model train-
ing algorithm and the membership inference binary classifier
training algorithm. Each element is customizable as a system
parameter when configuring MPLens for specific privacy risk
evaluation. The MPLens system makes no assumption on how
the attacker develops the shadow dataset, what knowledge is
included in the data, whether the attacker has knowledge of
the target model algorithm, or what attack technique is used.
This flexibility allows MPLens to support evaluation across
various transferable attack configurations.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Datasets
All experiments reported in this section were conducted
using the following four datasets.
a) CIFAR-10: The CIFAR-10 dataset contains 60,000
color images [35] and is publicly available. Each image is
formatted to be 32 x 32. The CIFAR-10 dataset contains 10
classes with 6,000 images each: airplane, automobile, bird, cat,
deer, dog, frog, horse, ship and truck. The problem is therefore
a 10-class classification problem where the task is to identify
which class is depicted in a given image.
Fig. 3: Overview of System to Evaluate Membership Inference Vulnerability
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Comparison of 2-D PCA for CIFAR-10 dog and truck classes. Plots show (1) training data, (2) data predicted as training data, and (3) data
predicted as non-training data by the membership inference attack.
b) CIFAR-100: Also publicly available, CIFAR-100 sim-
ilarly contains 60,000 color images [35] formatted to 32 x
32. 100 classes are represented ranging from various animals,
pieces of household furniture, or types of vehicles. Each class
has 600 available images. The problem is therefore a 100-class
image classification problem.
c) MNIST: MNIST is a publicly available dataset con-
taining 70,000 images of handwritten digits [36]. Each image
is formatted to be 32 x 32 and processed such that the digit
is at the center of the image. The MNIST dataset constitutes
a 10-class classification problem where the task is to identify
which digit between 0 and 9, inclusive, is contained within a
given image.
d) Labeled Faces in the Wild: The Labeled Faces in the
Wild (LFW) database contains face photographs for uncon-
strained face recognition with more than 13,000 images of
faces collected from the web. Each face has been labeled
with the name of the person pictured. 1,680 of the people
pictured have two or more distinct photos in the data set. Each
person is then labeled with a gender and race (including mixed
races). Data is then selected for the top 22 classes which were
represented with a sufficient number of data points.
B. Membership Inference Risk: Adversarial Examples
Given a target model and its training data, the membership
inference attack, using black-box access to the model predic-
tion API, can be used to create a representative dataset. This
representative dataset can be leveraged to generate substitute
models for the given target model. One can then use such sub-
stitute models to generate adversarial examples using different
adversarial attack methods [37].
Figures 4-6 provide visualization plots for the comparison
of 2-D PCA given the images of the dog and truck classes in
CIFAR-10. The plots are divided relative to the membership
inference attack prediction output including the true target
model training data (Figure 4), the data predicted by the
membership inference attack as training data (Figure 5), and
the data predicted as non-training data by the membership
inference attack (Figure 6).
These plots illustrate the accuracy of the distribution of
instances predicted as in the target model’s training dataset
through membership inference. They clearly demonstrate how
even with the inclusion of false positives, an attacker can
create a good representation of the training data distribution,
particularly compared to those instances not predicted to be in
the target training data. An attacker can therefore easily train
Fig. 7: Minority Class Percentage vs Membership Inference Vulner-
ability. Experiments are conducted with the CIFAR-10 dataset with
the automobile as the minority class.
a substitute model on this representative dataset which then
enables the generation of adversarial examples by attacking
this substitute model. Examples developed to successfully
attack a substitute model trained on the instances in Figure 4
are likely to also be successful against a model trained on the
instances in Figure 4.
C. Membership Inference Risk: Data Skewness
To date, the membership inference attack has been studied
either using training datasets with uniform class distribution
or without specific consideration of the impact of any data
skewness. However, as we demonstrated earlier, the risk of
membership inference vulnerability can vary when class rep-
resentation is skewed. Minority classes can display increased
risk to membership inference attack as models struggle to
more effectively generalize past the training data when fewer
instances are given. In this section, we focus on studying
the impact of data skewness on vulnerability to membership
inference attacks.
In Figure 7 we investigate the impact of data skewness on
membership inference vulnerability by controlling the repre-
sentation of a single class. We reduce the automobile images
from the CIFAR-10 dataset to only 1% of the data and then
increase the representation until the dataset is again balanced
with automobiles representing 10% of the training images. We
then plot the aggregate membership inference vulnerability
which is the overall membership inference attack accuracy
evaluated across all classes as well as the vulnerability of just
the automobile class.
Figure 7 demonstrates that in cases where the automobile
class constitutes 5% or less of the total training dataset, i.e.
the automobile class has fewer than half as many instances
as each of the other classes, this skewness will result in
the automobile class displaying more severe vulnerability to
membership inference attack.
Interestingly, the automobile class displays lower mem-
bership inference vulnerability than the average vulnerability
reported in the CIFAR-10 dataset when the dataset is balanced.
However, when the automobile class becomes a minority class
with fewer than half the instances of each of the other classes,
the vulnerability shifts to be greater than that reported by
the overall model. This gap becomes greater as continued
decreased representation results in continued increased vul-
nerability for the automobile class.
Target Population Attack Accuracy (%)
Aggregate 70.14
Male Images 68.18
Female Images 76.85
White Race Images 62.77
Racial Minority Images 89.90
TABLE IV: Vulnerability to membership inference attacks for dif-
ferent subsets of the LFW dataset.
Table IV additionally shows the vulnerability of a DNN
target model trained on the LFW dataset to membership
inference attacks. We analyze this vulnerability by breaking
down the aggregated vulnerability across the top 22 classes
into four different (non-disjoint) subsets of the LFW dataset:
Male, Female, White Race, and Racial Minority. We observe
that the training examples of racial minorities experience the
highest attack success rate (89.90%) and are thus highly
vulnerable to membership inference attacks compared to im-
ages of white individuals. Similarly, female images, which
represent less than 25% of the training data, demonstrate
higher average vulnerability (76.85%) compared with images
of males (68.18%).
To provide deeper insight and more intuitive illustration for
the increased vulnerability of minority groups under member-
ship inference attacks, Table V provides 7 individual examples
of images in the LFW dataset targeted by the membership
inference attack. That is, given a query with each example
image, the target model predicts the individual’s race and
gender (22 separate classes) which the attack model, a binary
classifier, uses to predict if that image was “in” or “out” of
the target model’s training dataset. The last row reports the
ground truth as to whether or not the image was in the target
model training set.
Through Table V, we highlight how minority populations
are more likely to be identified by an attacker with a higher
degree of confidence. We next discuss each example from left
to right to articulate the impact of data skewness on model
vulnerability to the membership inference attack.
For the 1st image, the target model is highly confident with
its prediction and its prediction is indeed correct. Using the
membership inference attack model, the attacker predicts that
the model must have seen this example with high confidence
and it succeeds in the membership inference attack.
For the 2nd image, the target model is less confident with
its prediction, although the prediction outcome is correct. The
attacker succeeds in the membership inference attack because
it correctly predicts that this example is not in the training set,
though the attackers confidence on this membership inference
is much less certain (close to 50%) compared to that of the
attack to the 1st image. We conjecture that the relatively
low prediction confidence by the target model may likely
contribute to the fact that the attacker is unable to obtain a
high confidence for his membership inference attack.
3 = correct
prediction
7 = wrong
prediction
Target
3 99.99 3 65.81 3 72.56 7 62.30 3 99.99 7 99.63 3 98.38Confidence (%)
Attacker
3 86.10 3 50.49 7 61.85 3 72.06 3 56.40 3 99.88 7 53.29Confidence (%)
In Training in out out out in out outData?
TABLE V: Examples of target and attack model performance and confidence on various images from the LFW dataset.
The 3rd image is predicted by the target model correctly
with a confidence of 72.56%, which is about 11.5% more
confidence than that for the 2nd image. However, the attacker
wrongly predicts that the example is in the training set when
the ground truth shows that this example is not in the training
set. Assuming the same logic as with the 1st image, i.e.,
the confidence and accuracy of target model prediction may
indicate that the image was in the training dataset, could have
caused the attacker to be misled.
For the 4th image, the target model has an incorrect pre-
diction with the confidence of 62.30%. The attacker correctly
predicts that this example is not in the training set. It is clear
that a somewhat confident and yet incorrect prediction by the
target model is likely to result in high attacker confidence that
this minority individual has not been seen during the training.
These four images highlight the compounding downfall
for minority populations. Models are more likely to overfit
these populations. This leads to poor test accuracy for these
populations and makes them more vulnerable to attack. As
the 3rd example shows, the way to fool attackers is to have
an accurate target model that can show reasonable confidence
when classifying minority test images.
We next compare the results from the previous four images
which represented minority classes with results from three
images representing the majority class (white male images).
For the 5th image in Table V, the target model predicts
correctly with high confidence and the attacker is able to
correctly predict that the image was in the training data. This
result can be interpreted through comparison with the attacker
performance for the 1st image. For the 5th query image which
is from the majority group, the attacker predicts correctly that
the image has been seen in training with barely over 50% in
confidence, showing relatively high uncertainty compared with
the 1st image from a minority class. This indicates that model
accuracy and confidence are weaker indicators with respect to
membership inference vulnerability for the majority class.
For the 6th image, the target model produces an incorrect
prediction with high confidence. The attacker is very confident
that the query image is not in the training dataset, which
is indeed the truth. This demonstrates rare a potential vul-
nerability for the majority class: When the target model has
high confidence in an inaccurate prediction, an attack model
is able to confidently succeed in the membership inference
attack. Through this example and the above analysis, we see
that the majority classes have two advantages compared to the
minority classes: (1) it is less common for the target model to
demonstrate this vulnerability of misclassification with high
confidence; and (2) for majority classes, the accuracy and
privacy are aligned rather than as competing objectives.
For the 7th image, the target model makes a correct predic-
tion with high confidence. The attacker makes the incorrect
prediction that the example was in the training dataset of the
target model. But the truth is that the example is not in the
training set. This membership attack failed and is the flip side
of the 5th image, with both reporting low attack confidence.
Again by comparing with the 1st image of minority, it shows
how model confidence and accuracy may lead to membership
inference vulnerability for the minority classes in a way that
is not true for the majority classes.
D. Mitigation with Differentially Private Training
The second core component of our experimental analysis is
to use MPLens to investigate the effectiveness of differential
privacy employed to deep learning models as a countermeasure
for membership inference mitigation.
To define utility loss we follow [38] and consider loss =
1 − dp−accacc where acc represents accuracy in a non-private
setting and dp− acc is the accuracy when differential privacy
is employed for the same model and data.
1) Model and Problem Complexity:
In Table VI compares three different datasets (first column)
and learning tasks (third column) using different model struc-
tures (second column). We measure utility loss incurred when
differential privacy is introduced, including both the training
loss and test loss, as well as the vulnerability when non-
private training is used. For MNIST, we follow the architecture
outlined in [12] by first applying PCA with 60 components to
reduce data dimensionality before feeding the data into simple
neural network with one hidden ReLU layer containing 1,000
units.
For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 we test two separate train-
ing approaches and architectures. First, we implement the
architecture used in [38] for both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
This includes no transfer learning but does include a PCA
transformation prior to training to reduce dimensionality to 50
features. The network used in this case consists of two fully
Dataset # Trainable Classes Train Loss Test Loss Non-PrivateParameters w/ DP (%) w/ DP (%) Vulnerability (%)
MNIST 71,010 10 5.09 3.51 53.11
CIFAR-10 83,978 10 55.90 14.34 72.58
CIFAR-100 107,108 100 82.66 49.34 74.04
CIFAR-10 1,036,810 10 51.00 26.59 72.94(with TL)
CIFAR-100 1,071,460 100 85.60 58.39 89.08(with TL)
TABLE VI: Problem complexity vs membership inference vulnera-
bility and differential privacy utility loss (, δ) = (10, 10−5)).
connected layers with 256 units each and a softmax layer for
the output.
We also follow the approach from [12] which uses two
ReLU convolutional layers with 64 channels, 5 × 5 convo-
lutions, and a stride of 1. Each convolutional layer is then
followed by a 2× 2 max pool. There are two fully connected
layers with 384 units before the final softmax layer. Prior
to training the network, transfer learning (TL) is used to
initialize model weights. For CIFAR-10 transfer learning is
done with the CIFAR-100 dataset while the reverse is done
for the CIFAR-100 dataset. The convolutional layers are fixed
so that only the fully connected and softmax layers are updated
during training. Finally, the data is cropped to 24×24 to further
reduce dimensionality.
For the non-private setting, we fix learning to 100 epochs
and use the RMSPROP optimizer with learning rate set to
0.001, decay to 1e − 6, and the batch size set at 32. For
the differential privacy setting we use some of the default
parameter values from the tensorflow privacy repository for
MNIST example [39]: setting the learning rate to 0.15, batch
size to 256, microbatches to 256, and the clipping value to
1.0. We then set the noise multiplier to the correct scale
according to the privacy budget (, δ) and 100 epochs of
learning. In Table VI, (, δ) = (10, 10−5). We employ the
Re´nyi accounting approach [40] and leverage the tensorflow
DPGRADIENTDESCENTGAUSSIANOPTIMIZER.
In Table VI we compare the five scenarios (rows) with re-
spect to utility loss and vulnerability of membership inference
attacks. The results demonstrate that there is an unfortunate
trade-off between the vulnerability and the usability of differ-
ential privacy as a mitigation technique. More complex models
and classification problems display more significant utility loss
when differential privacy is employed during the DNN model
training. The MNIST dataset represents a less complex dataset
than the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. In MNIST the
images are black and white with MNIST images of the same
class being more similar than the colored object images in the
CIFAR datasets. Therefore, the MNIST dataset is more easily
learned by a small DNN model architecture with reasonable
accuracy in the presence of a differentially private optimizer
which adds noise perturbation into each training epoch. Not
surprisingly, for the same reason, the MNIST model has
reduced vulnerability to membership inference attacks as the
training examples are more similar to one another.
The CIFAR-10 dataset, on the other hand, is more complex
and require more complex models with a greater number of
trainable parameters. In this case the models demonstrate a
higher vulnerability to membership inference attack than the
MNIST dataset. Unfortunately, this complexity also increases
the loss in utility when a differentially private optimizer is
employed in the model training.
Additionally, comparing the CIFAR-10 dataset with the
CIFAR-100 dataset, CIFAR-100 represents a more complex
learning problem with 100 possible classes rather than 10.
This again results in not only a more significant loss for the
CIFAR-100 dataset in the presence of differentially private
deep learning, but also higher vulnerability to membership
inference attacks.
Compare the two models trained on the most complex
dataset CIFAR-100, we observe the impact of the model
complexity on the vulnerability of membership inference at-
tack. The CIFAR-100 with transfer learning (last row) will
have a (24, 24, 3) image input compared to the 50 feature
input from the PCA approach using CIFAR-100 (third row).
After processing the image through the fixed convolutional
layers, the model with transfer learning still has significantly
more parameters (compare row 5 with row 3). We note the
more complex model structure (over 1 million parameters) has
increased membership inference vulnerability for the CIFAR-
100 dataset with 89.08% attack accuracy compared with the
vulnerability of 74.04% when using the less complex model
with reduced dimensionality of input (with 107,108 trainable
parameters). However the mode complex model also reports
a greater test loss of 58.39% compared to the loss of 49.34%
for the less complex model.
Our experimental results from Table VI underscore an
important observation. Using differential privacy as effective
mitigation for membership inference remains an open chal-
lenge. One primary reason is that even with differentially
private deep learning, the most vulnerable DNN models (and
datasets) are unfortunately also those which experience the
greatest utility loss.
2) Implications for Skewed Datasets:
An additional challenge in the deployment of differential
privacy is the impact on skewed datasets. Using the approach
and model structure from [38], we experiment with different
levels of data skewness in the CIFAR-10 dataset. We again
gradually decrease the representation of the automobile class
from 10% (even distribution) to 2% of the training data for a
fixed  of 1000. While this is a large  value when considering
the differential privacy theory, the results in [38] indicate that
more common theoretical  values, such as 1, result in no
meaningful learning at all. Our experiments also validate this
observation. We conduct this set of experiments by varying
the data skewness in the presence of the largest  reported
in [38]. In addition, we also measure and report the results
for smaller  with the automobile class set to 2% of its
training data. Figure 8 shows the results of these two sets
of experiments, measured using overall model accuracy loss
and automobile F-1 score loss. We compare the differentially
private deep learning setting with the non-private setting using
the same model architecture and data distribution. We report
the percentage of utility loss according to these scores.
In statistical analysis of binary classification, the F-1 score
Fig. 8: Impact of differentially private model training on minority classes.
measures the accuracy by considering both the precision and
the recall of the test to compute the score. The F-1 score
is the harmonic mean of the precision and recall. An F-
1 score reaches its best value at 1 (perfect precision and
recall) and worst at 0. Let p be the number of correct positive
results divided by the number of all positive results returned
by the classifier, and r be the number of correct positive
results divided by the number of all relevant samples (all
samples that should have been identified as positive). We have
F − 1 = 2(p × r)/(p + r). To isolate the utility loss for
the automobile class we therefore report the loss in F-1 score
calculated using the precision and recall of only the automobile
class where automobile is considered positive and all other
classes negative.
On the left sub-figure of Figure 8, we compare the accuracy
loss of the overall model with the loss in F-1 score of the
automobile class (class 1). We vary the data skewness of the
automobile class in the training set, and report the results by
the percentage of decrease in F-1 score when using differen-
tially private deep learning setting compared to the non-private
deep learning setting. This left sub-figure shows that as the
skewness decreases from 2% to 10% (X-axis), the gap between
the private setting and the non-private setting becomes closer.
When the data skewness is high for the automobile class (class
1), the minority group is more vulnerable, as seen in Figure 7,
but unfortunately also shows the greatest utility loss for both
training and test when differential privacy is introduced.
On the right sub-figure of Figure 8, we again compare the
accuracy loss of the overall model with the loss in F-1 score of
the automobile class (class 1). This time we vary the privacy
parameter  from 10 to 1000, and report the measurement
results by the percentage of utility loss when using a dif-
ferentially private deep learning setting compared to a non-
private deep learning setting. We observe that the minority
group has much higher utility loss under the privacy setting,
even when the privacy budget parameter  is set to larger (and
theoretically almost meaningless) values. This confirms the
observation that differential privacy as a mitigation technique
presents a catch-22 as the minority class is more likely to be
successfully targeted by a membership inference attack but
also suffers the most under differential privacy.
In summary, Figure 8 highlights how differential privacy as
a mitigation technique also leads to unfortunate outcomes for
minority classes. That is, the data which is most vulnerable
to attack is also the most likely to experience intolerable
accuracy loss under differentially private setting compared
to non-private setting. This mirrors the challenge wherein
complex datasets and complex model architectures are more
vulnerable to membership inference attacks, and at the same
time, are also more likely to experience significant accuracy
loss with differentially private deep learning.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERATED LEARNING SYSTEMS
In response to legislative restrictions on data sharing,
federated learning has gained increased attention from both
academics and industry. In a federated learning environment,
multiple institutions (or individuals) may leverage their collec-
tive data by sharing model parameters rather than sharing raw
data. For example, rather than a group of financial institutions
sharing their data with one central authority for model training,
each can learn a federated model by sharing model parameters
and keeping their training data private. Such federated model
should be more accurate in prediction than any single partici-
pant’s model. There are a number of ways one can build such a
federated learning model. First, one can share the local training
parameters during each epoch or each iteration of the local
model training in a federated learning system. This allows
cross-model learning in an iterative manner. Alternatively,
one can also build a federated learning model by sharing
the model parameters or the locally trained model after each
participant has completed its local training over its private
training dataset. In this scenario, the federated learning model
can be viewed as an ensemble of its participants trained models
over a horizontally partitioned dataset, which is the union of
its participants training datasets.
Recent work on membership inference has shown that
federated learning exposes participants to significant privacy
risk [14], [15], [41]. In response to such membership pri-
vacy vulnerability, proposals for privacy-preserving federated
learning have been put forward, including adding differen-
tially private noise prior to the parameter updates by each
party [42]–[44]. However, preliminary results have indicated
that each individual participant is likely to have different
privacy risks [42]. Also when taking into account the privacy
policy of the participating institution, the sensitivity of the data
held by that institution, and the distribution of their data, one
institution may demand a higher degree of privacy than another
participant. We argue that the membership privacy analysis
and the membership inference mitigation through differential
privacy can be a valuable component in the research and
development of federated machine learning systems for real-
world mission critical applications.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Existing related research can be broadly classified into three
categories: (1) membership inference, (2) the connection be-
tween membership inference and adversarial machine learning,
and (3) differential privacy as a mitigation technique.
Membership Inference Attacks. The membership infer-
ence attack against machine learning models was first pre-
sented in [17] where the authors proposed the shadow model
attack. [14] characterized attack vulnerability with respect
to different model types and datasets and introduced the
vulnerability of loosely federated systems while the authors
in [18] relax adversarial assumptions and generate a model
and data independent attacker. Hayes et. al. demonstrate the
membership inference vulnerability of generative models [45]
while Melis et al. highlight the potential for feature leakage
in collaborative learning environments [46]. Finally in [47]
the authors articulate the power of black-box attacks com-
pared with white-box attacks. We expand on the foundation
from these works to offer new insights for the membership
inference attack particularly focusing on skewed datasets and
differentially private mitigation techniques.
Membership Inference and Adversarial Machine Learn-
ing. There have been some recent works in analyzing the
connection between membership inference and adversarial
machine learning. Song et al. [48] and Mejia et. al. [49]
demonstrate that existing adversarial defense methods cause
an increase in membership inference vulnerability. Our mem-
bership inference evaluation system highlights the orthogonal
risk. That is, how membership inference can inform adversarial
machine learning attackers.
Differential Privacy to Mitigate Membership Inference.
Both [38] and [50] investigate differential privacy as a mitiga-
tion technique for membership inference attacks. Both indicate
that existing differential privacy techniques do not display vi-
able accuracy and privacy protection trade-offs. That is, either
models show large accuracy losses or display high membership
inference vulnerability. We extend this line of work to inves-
tigate the implications of DNN model complexity, learning
task complexity, and data skewness on membership inference
vulnerability and on the effectiveness of differentially private
learning as a mitigation strategy.
IX. CONCLUSION
Membership inference attacks seek to infer membership
of individual training instances of a privately trained model
through black-box access to the prediction API of a MLaaS
provider. This paper provides an in-depth characterization of
membership inference vulnerability from multiple perspec-
tives. We develop MPLens to expose membership inference
vulnerability and perform privacy analysis and privacy com-
pliance evaluation. We demonstrate how membership inference
attack methods can be used in the development of represen-
tative datasets which not only signify a privacy leakage but
also facilitate the generation of substitute models with respect
to the attack target model, therefore heightening the risk
for adversarial attacks. We investigate training data skewness
and its impact on membership inference vulnerability. We
also evaluate differential privacy as a mitigation technique
for membership inference against deep learning models. Our
empirical results show that (1) minority groups within skewed
datasets display increased risk for membership inference and
(2) differential privacy presents many trade-offs as a mitigation
technique to membership inference risk.
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